Opinion: The logic of Iran’s brinkmanship

A woman stands next to Iranian-made Zolfaghar missiles displayed in Azadi Square in Tehran on July 24. Photo by AFP via Getty Images

Article content

Iran’s decision to escalate the war last week appears counterintuitive. As Omani mediators sought to preserve a diplomatic opening through a renewed truce and continued negotiations over the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran instead launched a direct ballistic missile attack on U.S. bases in Jordan, while expanding pressure across other fronts. The move sharply increased the risk of a broader regional conflict.

Article content

Article content

Reports soon emerged that Washington was preparing strikes against Iranian energy infrastructure before Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates reportedly intervened to preserve the diplomatic track. Why did Tehran choose escalation at the very moment when an off-ramp appeared within reach? The answer lies in the Islamic Republic’s internal balance of power.

Article content

Article content

Article content

Three distinct centres of power currently compete over how Iran should prosecute the war and negotiate its eventual settlement. They differ on methods and acceptable levels of risk. Yet they remain broadly aligned on the strategic objectives they seek to achieve.

Article content

The first, and currently the most influential, is the faction that’s likely led by Ahmad Vahidi, commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This camp represents the dominant force in shaping Iran’s wartime decisions. It views military pressure as the prerequisite for any meaningful outcome and insists that, if negotiations occur at all, they must proceed from a position of strength.

Article content

For Vahidi, the Strait of Hormuz is Iran’s principal source of strategic leverage. Maintaining coercive control over the Strait strengthens its hand in future negotiations over its nuclear program. Losing that leverage would weaken Tehran’s bargaining position long after the current war ends.

Article content

Article content

The second faction is represented by President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. This camp’s priority is to contain the economic damage that war and sanctions are inflicting on the regime.

Article content

Article content

They are equally concerned about the domestic front. A population that has repeatedly demonstrated its desire for political change is a strategic challenge no less consequential than the military confrontation abroad. They are prepared to negotiate limited compromises over the administration of the Strait of Hormuz.

Article content

The third faction, centred on the Paydari Front and figures such as Saeed Jalili, rejects negotiations with Washington altogether. Although smaller than the other two camps, it continues to exert ideological pressure against compromise and enjoys influence through key state institutions, such as Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting.

Article content

This group’s strategy is to move beyond a defensive posture and seize the initiative. Rather than confining the conflict to Iranian territory, it seeks to widen the theatre across the region and beyond, raising the costs for Iran’s adversaries and restoring deterrence on more favourable terms.