Mark Norman: Canada’s defence-spending quagmire

Photo by HYUNGCHEOL PARK/Postmedia

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Countries don’t typically get report cards, but there are hard facts that can be collated, assessed and compared. Enter Benchmark Canada, a new project from the Macdonald-Laurier Institute that brings together more than 40 different metrics that measure this nation’s performance. This fall, the National Post is examining many of those findings.

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I was pleased to have been asked to contribute to the analysis of Canada’s defence spending and related metrics by the team at Benchmark Canada. I commend the process and believe it will be helpful in informing public discourse and debate about defence spending and the rebuilding of Canada’s military and security capabilities. With that said, however, building and maintaining an effective military is a complex undertaking and we should be careful what conclusions or inferences we draw from the analysis. I will refrain from focusing too much on the data itself, and instead I will try to provide context and a broader understanding of the implications of what the analysis tells us.

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The bottom-line up front — at least at the macro level — is that Canada has met its minimal NATO spending target of two per cent of GDP, and we appear to be on a viable trajectory toward achieving the revised targets of 3.5 per cent and ultimately five per cent over the coming decade or so. Although this might be considered a significant accomplishment, it simply puts Canada in compliance with the previously agreed target and removes the awkward and embarrassing distinction of “laggard” among our allies. Notwithstanding the considerable effort to achieve this result, little has actually changed in terms of our defence capabilities and outputs, and it will take considerable time for the impacts of the increased spending to actually materialize.

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This arguably stark reality is important — not because it underpins any intended criticism, but because it is an inconvenient truth that we cannot just assume away. We are starting from a structural deficit both in terms of the direct impacts of decades of under-investment, but also in terms of the systems and processes that allow us to translate spending into actual capability. In this context, therefore, the numbers themselves, and even a basic analysis thereof, don’t tell the entire tale of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).

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To fully understand the deeper implications of what is going on behind the scenes of Canada’s defence business, a more comprehensive understanding of how all the constituent elements fit together is required. In essence, building and sustaining a military can be represented by a complex equation with multiple variables. Typically, analysis — whether it be internal or external — tends to focus on individual variables in isolation rather than a holistic perspective. Understandably, therefore, this creates unintended consequences downstream as the subsequent impacts of adjusting one variable on the rest of the equation can often be ignored and take years or decades to manifest.

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This is in part why efforts to try and rebuild or transform the CAF are often short-lived or unsuccessful as they tend to focus on short-term objectives and, as such, fail to “fix” many of the underlying structural problems. Additionally, the recurring fascination with things such as the politics of defence, spending analysis, procurement problems and recruiting numbers address only a few of the many variables in this otherwise complex equation. We must also make an important distinction between inputs and outputs. Equipment, people, organizational structures, doctrine, infrastructure, training, maintenance, logistics and spare parts are all outputs of investment decisions as much as they are inputs to overall military capability and readiness.